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2. The larger question of whether people should work longer at the expense of 
greater leisure is not addressed. For any individual, the choice between work and 
leisure is a personal decision. For the society as a whole, it is a value judgment. 
This comment simply assumes that greater productivity is a public good from an 
economic standpoint.
3.  In a related issue, the disability system is inconsistent in its goals, unfair in its 
results, and uneven in its administration. Considering its $110 billion annual pro-
gram cost, and $8 billion administrative cost, it is in imperative need of substan-
tive and procedural reform. But without the fundamental conditions for major 
reform being present, little can be expected to happen legislatively.
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Pride, envy, gluttony, lust, anger, greed, and sloth—theologians tell us 
that we become better people by examining these sources of failure. 
But my concern here is not with the classic seven deadly sins, but what 
I feel are the contemporary seven deadly sins being committed in current 
policy and research on aging.  Reﬂ  ecting on them likewise provides some 
warning signs for us acting as policymakers, researchers, or prognostica-
tors. 
I am not, of course, going to accuse any particular person of commit-
ting the sins I am about to discuss, since I am well aware of the Biblical 
injunction that only one who is without sin in these matters is allowed 
to cast stones.  More to the point, these shortcomings, some of omission 
and some of commission, are social sins: these overlay the macroeco-
nomic debate on aging even when some of us researchers and policymak-
ers claim personally at a micro-level to have avoided them. Finally, I am 
sure that some of you have different religious training, and will decide 
that some of what I label “sins” are actually virtues. 
Deadly Sin # 1: Giving Too Little Attention to the Labor Side of the 
Aging Debate
The ﬁ  rst deadly sin is paying too little attention to the labor (as opposed 
to capital) side of the aging debate. By listing this ﬁ  rst, I am obviously 
preaching to the choir assembled here. I congratulate Cathy Minehan, 
Bob Triest, and their Boston Fed colleagues for their leadership in taking 
on this most important, yet usually neglected, issue in the aging policy 
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Look closely at projections such as those performed by the Social Secu-
rity actuaries. Ignore any of the black box aspects of what these fore-
casters do, and it is actually quite easy to approximate their long-term 
projections by looking at nothing more than the projected change in the 
ratio of workers to beneﬁ  ciaries. In a pay-as-you go system, a decrease 
in that ratio from 3-to-1 to 2-to-1 (more precisely, from the ratio of 3.3 
workers per beneﬁ  ciary in 2008 to 2.1 by 2040) means approximately 
that per worker revenues need to grow by one-half, or per-beneﬁ  ciary 
spending fall by one-third. Those last fractions are fairly close to the pro-
jections by the actuaries of what would be needed in revenue increases or 
spending cuts to restore pay-as-you-go balance by about 2040.
But that labor force issue is not how we explain—I should say, obfus-
cate—the issue when talking to the American public. Instead, we discuss 
Social Security’s trust fund balances. We talk about spending down the 
trust funds, even though those funds never contained more than one-
tenth of Social Security’s long-term liabilities. We talk about introducing 
individual or personal accounts—like 401(k) plans paid for directly with 
our Social Security taxes—and pretend that these can magically grow 
into large future retirement beneﬁ  ts with no sacriﬁ  ce now. We start exam-
ining ways to reshufﬂ  e funds so that we can borrow at 0 to 3 percent real 
interest rates today, invest in a stock market paying 7 percent real annual 
returns on average, and then reap magic money through arbitrage. All of 
these ideas are discussed as if there are no risks involved, and no one is 
on the other side of each ﬁ  nancial transaction. 
In effect, through these various diversionary discussions, we convert 
what is primarily a labor market problem into a ﬁ  nancial market prob-
lem, with ﬁ  nancial solutions obtained by wielding our actuarial and eco-
nomic weapons, making our present value and trust fund calculations, 
and pretending large gains will be painlessly wrung from better manipu-
lation of these ﬁ  nancial accounts. 
I’ve been an observer of Washington policymaking for more than 
three decades now, and there has not been a single year in which Con-
gress did not adopt some new incentive for saving or investment, often 
through policies affecting private pensions or retirement accounts or dif-
ferent types of saving plans.  Yet national saving rates have declined, 
personal savings rates have even fallen below zero in recent years, and 
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most people still go into retirement with only modest private assets. I am 
not going to go through the reasons why these programs have largely 
failed, but the history of these failures should warn us about how far we 
can go in thinking that we can solve this looming labor market problem 
merely through attempts to ramp up saving, however worthy a goal in 
itself. 
Why have we collectively, as researchers, policymakers, and a nation, 
failed to pay much attention to the labor market piece of the aging issue? 
This failure centers in part around the way we deﬁ  ne the problem and 
how we form expectations based on historic precedent. One aspect of the 
deﬁ  nitional failure, which I will return to shortly, is the simplistic and 
misleading deﬁ  nition of an “aged” person or society. Right now I want 
to focus on another simplistic (and related) assumption: that in a grow-
ing economy we will always want to retire for longer and longer periods 
and, therefore, retirement policy is largely a matter of adjusting to that 
inexorable force.
Perhaps you think this is not a simplistic assumption, but rather that 
it has well-established theoretical and historical underpinnings. In eco-
nomic theory, leisure is used to provide closure to some mathematical 
models that economists use, but, let’s be honest: in point of fact, “leisure” 
is almost a meaningless concept. People, at least those who are not econ-
omists, don’t just do “nothing.” Granted, as societies get richer, people 
do demand a lot more of many “good” things, and often in increasing 
proportions.  Among those intangible items we seek are freedom from 
ﬁ  nancial pressures and the dictates of superiors in our jobs; we don’t 
like outside forces to command our use of time to do things we really 
don’t like doing. Yet in today’s service-oriented and Internet-driven econ-
omy, pleasurable activities—including intellectual challenges and enjoy-
able social interactions—increasingly can be sought on the job, not just 
through dropping out of the labor force. Fewer of us are stuck at the lathe, 
unable to talk to friends during the day, or unchallenged mentally on the 
job. The “new” economy means that we need to revise many of our ideas 
about what constitutes “work” and what constitutes “leisure.” 
Now you may assert that regardless of abstract economic theory, empir-
ical and historical work supports the notion that leisure, so to speak, is 
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a century ago, almost no one retired at all from the labor force. Veblen’s 
1899 book, The Theory of the Leisure Class, offers one anecdotal piece 
of evidence for this assertion, when he contrasts the small leisure class 
with the much broader working class. Back then, most people were farm-
ers and did some share of the family’s chores almost until the day they 
died. I guess starting from zero, time off from hard work is a superior 
good for a while, but that does not offer much evidence for its retaining 
its same value over time, especially when the structure of work is chang-
ing rapidly.  
Put another way, we don’t always seek more leisure. We seek more 
freedom and more enjoyable and stimulating activities. At various mar-
gins those good things might just as well be found in the workplace as off 
the job. Even if we did want more time off the job, it’s not clear why we 
would want exactly 100 percent time off from work and only for the last 
third or so of our adult lives.
The industrial revolution, of course, changed work and family struc-
tures largely by separating paid employment from family, social, and vol-
unteer life. But the traditional industrial economy has been on the wane 
for quite some time. Today, in the information age, growth in output more 
and more centers on services that can be provided in the proﬁ  t-making 
sector, the non-proﬁ  t sector, or the household sector alike. A similar story 
can be told of growth rates within occupations. Think of occupations 
in healthcare and the knowledge economy. This change in the economy 
implies that many aspects of life are becoming less compartmentalized 
over time. Devices like a period of retirement—a consecutive rather than 
simultaneous approach to providing the beneﬁ  ts of greater freedom—are 
less necessary to enable people, while participating in the workforce, to 
fulﬁ  ll many different sides of their personal development. 
Now let’s look beyond theory to actual labor data. Over the last half 
of the twentieth century, we ﬁ  nd that the percentage of adults who were 
employed in the United States increased rather than declined in just about 
every non-recession year. Hours of work also increased over this same 
period. Does this data indicate that we always demand more and more 
leisure? 
Well, some might retort that sociological, not economic, factors were 
at play during this period. American women entered the labor force 
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faster than American men dropped out of it. The Pill meant having fewer 
kids, while new types of durable goods, like dishwashers and microwave 
ovens, and institutional changes, like equal rights and reduced discrimi-
nation, were all factors that enabled women, often much better educated 
than their predecessors, to enter the workforce in increasingly larger 
numbers.
In point of fact, these sociological factors were important, but mostly 
by empowering women to provide the labor supply that we as a soci-
ety demanded. That is, there still was a labor demand curve reﬂ  ecting 
our nation’s demand for goods and services relative to what could be 
produced. 
It is common these days to use time series data of age/sex speciﬁ  c 
actual labor supply to project future labor supply. A few assumptions 
are added—for instance, as they age, younger women will have a larger 
labor force participation rate when they are older than do older women 
today—but these additions don’t have huge effects on the ultimate esti-
mates of aggregate labor supply. Basically, new cohorts of the same age 
Figure 7.1 
U.S Labor Force Participation Rates for Men and Women Aged 55 Years
and Older Compared with the Entire Adult Population, 1948–2004
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and sex are largely assumed to behave the same way as do current cohorts 
(with some modest upticks). For instance, if 70 percent of men aged 62 
currently don’t work, then it is assumed that 50 years from now roughly 
the same percentage of men that age will also not work. Since there will 
be a much larger percentage of people in retirement age, as traditionally 
deﬁ  ned, under these kinds of projections the percent of adults working 
will decline quite signiﬁ  cantly (for instance, from three workers per ben-
eﬁ  ciary to two per beneﬁ  ciary). 
Yet, in addition to misrepresenting the demand for freedom as a demand 
for leisure, as discussed above, the complication with this approach is 
that it essentially fails to assume much, if anything, about even the exis-
tence of a labor demand function. For instance, the data over the last half 
of the twentieth century is roughly consistent with a relatively inelastic 
labor demand curve boosted by an increase in labor supplied in the for-
mal versus informal labor market, as women responded to the sociologi-
cal factors already mentioned. When labor demand is introduced, all of 
a sudden different age/sex groups can be seen to be responding to that 
demand function according to the sets of relative opportunities facing 
them, thus helping explain the relative shifts in male and female partici-
pation rates. Labor demand also provides a partial explanation for the 
conversion from deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t to deﬁ  ned contribution plans, as employ-
ees tend to work longer when deﬁ  ned contribution plans are in place. 
Traditional deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plans often pushed them out of the workforce 
at ages as early as 50, 55, and almost always by 60 or 62, as these private 
plans usually provide negative economic accruals of pension beneﬁ  ts for 
working longer. 
I am not asserting that labor demand is inelastic, only that our projec-
tions do not do a good job of dealing with the inﬂ  uence of labor demand 
on labor supply.
As a prognosticator, I will stick my neck out here. I predict that in the 
ﬁ  rst half of the twenty-ﬁ  rst century, older Americans aged 55 years or 
more are going to occupy the position that women occupied in the last 
half of the twentieth century—the largest pool of underutilized talent and 
human capital in the economy. And that in response to a potential short-
age of workers, their labor force participation will increase much more 
than implied by almost all projections made today.
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Deadly Sin # 2: Making Policy Without Setting Real Targets
The policy debate over many aging issues usually proceeds without any 
real targets based upon established principles, such as progressivity, efﬁ  -
ciency, or the equal treatment of individuals. For instance, take many 
of the recent debates that have centered either on preserving the current 
Social Security system or taking a portion of existing Social Security taxes 
and directing these toward individual personal accounts that would oper-
ate somewhat like individual retirement accounts (IRAs). What do those 
objectives even mean? “The current system” is hardly a principled target, 
and neither are “personal accounts.” These concepts may be the means 
to some ends, but the ends need to be speciﬁ  ed.
For instance, consider progressivity or “vertical equity,” as opposed 
to equal justice for those in equal circumstances, or “horizontal equity.” 
Presumably one goal of Social Security is to protect people from poverty 
or to redistribute income in some manner. The establishment of a pro-
gressive beneﬁ  t schedule clearly indicates a desire to instill a fair degree of 
progressivity, or income redistribution to those less well-off, into the pro-
gram. Fascinatingly, however, until the past few years almost no one even 
tried to measure what progressivity the Social Security system actually 
achieved. Or how this goal has changed over time. Like so many policy 
debates, the focus seemed to be more on symbol than on substance. 
When the 2001 Social Security commission established by President 
Bush was in the midst of its debate, groups on both left and right tried 
to lay claim to concerns over progressivity by playing the race card. One 
side claimed that blacks and other shorter-lived groups lost out in Social 
Security because of forced annuitization. Opponents of this view asserted 
that increasing the retirement age would disadvantage these same groups.   
Yet neither side asked for or used any empirical work to back up their a 
priori assertions. You’d think those policymakers and economists mak-
ing such proposals would want to know those facts so they could modify 
their proposals to achieve some realistic target for progressivity.  Ideology 
trumped empirics.
A similar complaint can be lodged against the debate over whether 
to carve some personal accounts, almost like mandated 401(k)s, out 
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presumably to try to increase the supply of saving.  But if that is the goal, 
then one has to be careful about the deﬁ  cits the government would likely 
run to ﬁ  nance these accounts. In addition, even if the government did 
not ﬁ  nance its saving subsidies out of it own deﬁ  cits or dissaving, one 
has to worry about the extent to which individual saving in such man-
dated Social Security accounts would be offset by the ability of people 
to put less money in other accounts or to borrow from other retirement 
accounts like 401(k)s, hence reducing any net saving. These behavioral 
issues, again, were largely ignored in most recent public debates on Social 
Security, including those surrounding the 2001 Commission set up by 
President Bush, as well as his efforts after the 2004 election to generate 
interest in Social Security reform. To a large extent, these reforms have 
been debated without agreeing on precise targets as to what the system 
should do, other than eventually be in some sort of ﬁ  nancial balance. 
Deadly Sin #3: Limiting the Debate So as to Be Politically Correct
The third deadly sin committed by so many in our economics profession 
is to limit the debate about aging to issues that are politically correct, at 
least within each political party or ideology. Topics such as progressivity 
and increasing retirement savings at least have been on the table, even if 
these issues were often engaged in a symbolic rather than in a real way. 
But many other important issues and principles are not even on the table: 
these considerations have largely been ignored because these are not the 
politically correct ﬁ  ghts of the day.
For instance, whatever happened to equal justice? The current Social 
Security system sanctions a broad and blanket discrimination against 
abandoned parents and other single heads of household, one that would 
be clearly illegal for private pensions and private property. Largely 
women, these individuals often work more hours, pay more taxes, raise 
more children, and get fewer beneﬁ  ts than other individuals who just 
happened to marry somebody with higher earnings. All other sorts of 
related glitches occur in the current system because of its outdated struc-
ture of family beneﬁ  ts designed around an Ozzie-and-Harriet-type house-
hold with only one working adult, who is male. Furthermore, consider 
the inequities surrounding the ability of a worker to generate beneﬁ  ts 
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for multiple spouses without paying a dime for any of them, the extra 
beneﬁ  ts offered largely to men who have children late in life, the dis-
crimination in favor of someone working 30 years and earning $40,000 
a year over someone working 40 years and earning $30,000 a year, and 
the denial of any spousal rights to a women who is married to the father 
of her children for less than 10 years. 
I have approached some well-known expert authors of Social Security 
books and proposals over the years, and all admit that the current sys-
tem of family beneﬁ  ts, as well as some other aspects of Social Security, 
are both unfair and inefﬁ  cient. These shortcomings are slam dunk issues 
for any reform based on principles of equal justice or horizontal equity, 
regardless of how one comes out on some tougher issues, such as how 
large the system should be and the extent to which greater progressivity 
reduces economic efﬁ  ciency. But these authors invariably respond that 
these issues are difﬁ  cult politically because any remedies would create 
some losers along with winners, and so they decide to dodge considering 
them. I ﬁ  nd this avoidance, particularly by experts, disturbing. It would 
be one thing if these problems were conﬁ  ned to a limited period of time. 
However, in theory we build these systems to be permanent—so the dis-
crimination will last eternally, or at least decades until the next major 
reform, and will grow in absolute terms along the way. I believe we have 
obligations as analysts to present a comprehensive and objective picture 
of the current failings in the Social Security system, and save the political 
compromises for the politicians to work out.
Deadly Sin #4: Misusing “Aging” as a Term
The fourth deadly sin relates to how we misuse the word “aging,” and 
some potential analytical errors that follow from this misnomer. To begin 
with, a crucial distinction must be made between the concept of people 
simply living longer, and the aging of an entire population due to lower 
birth rates. In the ﬁ  rst instance, we are largely measuring improvements 
in health status at given ages. For instance, a 65-year-old person alive 
today has more well-being than a 65-year-old living in 1940, at least as 
measured by having more years of life expectancy at that age and, as it 
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living longer does not by itself “age” a population; that is, there is no 
necessary increase in the proportion of the population closer to death or 
in worse health because of an increase in longevity. Put another way, if 
“old” means being in the last ten (or ﬁ  fteen) years of life, or bearing the 
disabilities that often accompany “old” age, then the fact that we are liv-
ing longer does not mean that we are spending more years as “aged” or 
that the population is “aging.” 
Here’s an exaggerated example to make this point. If the population 
were suddenly to live on average to 100 years of age, rather than to 70 
years, would one assert that age 62 is “old” in both scenarios?
On the other hand, the decline in the birth rate clearly does decrease 
the percent of the population in their early years of life, and increase the 
percent who are in their last years. For example, the proportion of the 
population within ﬁ  ve years of death will eventually rise. In this scenario, 
social needs might indeed be relatively greater for items like assisted liv-
ing vis-à-vis transportation or housing.
How “aging” is deﬁ  ned has strong implications for our research and 
the conclusions drawn from these studies. Many current analyses assume 
that age from birth represents the same variable in measuring a person’s 
status in 1940 as it does in 2007. To the contrary, I suggest that it is more 
appropriate in later ages to measure people of equivalent age over time by 
their remaining life expectancy, or at least their relative age (such as being 
in the last 10 percent of their lives, as measured by life expectancy). 
In one simple analysis, I compared the labor force participation rate of 
men aged 65 years with the participation rate of men having close to 17 
years of remaining life expectancy for the 1940–2001 period. While the 
former showed a more steady drop in participation over most years of 
that period, the latter showed almost no drop in participation for about 
25 years until the early 1960s, when two major events occurred—in 1962 
men were granted an early retirement age of 62, and Medicare was made 
available in 1965.  These different curves imply very different weights for 
the inﬂ  uence of policy relative to an ever-increasing demand for leisure 
over time. 
Our use of words associated with age and aging also have powerful 
signaling effects. If 62-year-old individuals are told they are “old,” they 
may act accordingly. I once made an appeal in a column to reform Social 
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Security’s Old Age and Survivors Insurance by re-labeling it “The Mid-
dle-Age, Old Age, and Survivors Insurance System” when it provided 
beneﬁ  ts beyond some expected number of years, such as 15. I was not 
being facetious. The right label would probably go a long way toward 
achieving reform, since “old” is still correlated in many people’s minds 
with disability and incapacity.  Providing early retirement beneﬁ  ts for the 
middle-aged is a very different animal than providing needed retirement 
help for the truly elderly portion of the population.
Deadly Sin #5: Ignoring the Balance Sheet
Committing deadly sin #5, ignoring the budget balance sheet, is as easy 
a trap for policymakers and researchers as the Sirens’ call is for sail-
ors. Sometimes, when the amounts are small and the returns to marginal 
efforts are large, the budgetary issue is less important. However, when 
programs like Social Security and Medicare become huge relative to the 
Figure 7.2 
U.S. Labor Force Participation Rates for Men, 1940–2001
Source: C. Eugene Steuerle, Adam Carasso, and Meghan Bishop. 2002. The 
Urban Institute. Based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the 
U.S. Census of Population, and the U.S. Social Security Administration.
Percent
Age 58.5 in 1940
Men with 16.4 years of life expectancy
Men age 65 in 2001
under either measure


























Men age 65Current and Future Challenges for Policy and Research 354
rest of the federal budget, their movement has dramatic effects on other 
programs, just as the movement of an elephant in a room would affect 
everyone else in it.
Let me give some examples of how incomplete balance sheet account-
ing distorts policy predictions.
Consider the issue of taking earlier or later retirement. This decision 
affects not just beneﬁ  ts but the revenues that fund entitlement programs 
and the rest of government. Some calculations mainly attend to the effect 
on beneﬁ  ts, or beneﬁ  ts relative to past cash wages, as in calculations 
of replacement rates. The Social Security actuaries do better when they 
look to the trust funds, since those calculations at least incorporate Social 
Security revenues. But then they stop there.
In point of fact, when a person retires and drops out of the workforce, 
there is a decline in output and income roughly equal to that person’s 
marginal output or income from labor. As an example, take a worker 
making $50,000 a year who retires and collects beneﬁ  ts. If there is no 
new worker to replace this person, national income falls by $50,000, 
but almost all of the loss must be borne by others. That is, not only 
must someone come up with the extra $24,000 to pay Social Security 
and Medicare beneﬁ  ts to this retiree, but existing programs (including 
Social Security and Medicare) must get by with $16,000 less in income 
tax, Social Security tax, and other revenues that were used in part to 
fund other individuals’ beneﬁ  ts from government programs. The Social 
Security Administration does not estimate most of these revenue effects 
when analyzing reform proposals, nor does it report on the worker’s loss 
of other income from the wages that are foregone.
Another example derives from looking at the federal budget as a whole. 
Consider ﬁ  rst that growth in beneﬁ  ts is so rapid that an average-income 
50-year-old couple today is scheduled to get about one million dollars’ 
worth of Social Security and Medicare beneﬁ  ts across the 26 or so years 
that one or the other is expected to be drawing beneﬁ  ts. That is, this 
couple would need an interest-earning bank account of $1 million (in 
today’s dollars) by age 65 to cover the cost of its future Social Security 
and Medicare beneﬁ  ts. Younger couples get even more because beneﬁ  ts 
are scheduled to increase continually over time.
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But we don’t need to wait to see what this growth toward million-
dollar-plus packages of beneﬁ  ts, plus the decline of the percent of adults 
working, does to the government balance sheet right now. Between 2006 
and 2010, for instance, the cost of paying Social Security, Medicare, and 
Medicaid beneﬁ  ts is scheduled to grow by $326 billion. The growth in 
revenues implied by current law is only expected to be $494 billion over 
the same period. In other words, these three programs will absorb two-
thirds of all revenue growth. (Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid 
already constitute about 40 percent of total spending.) If defense expen-
ditures fall moderately relative to GDP, and we add in interest on the 
federal debt, my calculations show that by sometime before 2020 there 
are no revenues left for any other function of government other than 
providing defense, Medicaid, Medicare, and Social Security.  Basically, 
middle-aged people today are scheduled, by the time they retire, to get 
almost everything government provides—for themselves. Their children 
and grandchildren are not scheduled to get much of anything, until they 
retire. Clearly, this situation is not morally, economically, or politically 
sustainable, but currently we are doing nothing to address the balance 
sheet implications of the policies now in place. 
Deadly Sin # 6: Assuming Away Arbitrary Aspects of the Status Quo 
Many economists love to argue that the status quo represents some logi-
cal equilibrium of market forces striving toward balance. The complica-
tion was that, at least until recently, they would discount the inﬂ  uence 
of arbitrary accidents, herd instincts, and other commonly recognized 
irrational and unpredictable human behaviors when making policy rec-
ommendations.
In the case of aging research, this status quo approach often assumes 
away the importance of downright bad policy design. Former Reagan 
press secretary Jim Brady had a term for how these types of situations 
come about, the BOGSAT method of decisionmaking: Bunch of Guys 
Sitting Around a Table.
It wouldn’t be so bad if we just acknowledged that the BOGSAT 
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icy was made, and then tried to adjust it pragmatically from then on. But 
once policy gets enacted, all sort of interest groups will assert that the 
process for arriving at that result was arrived at in some totally rational 
way. They will usually succeed in getting some economists to fall in line 
as defenders of the faith, to bolster their argument that some crazy line of 
arbitrary policymaking represents some ideal economic equilibrium.  
Let me give you one concrete example—deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t pension plans.   
If one thinks about the history of deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t (DB) plan design, the 
main rationale seems to be that early on, when pension schemes were 
young and seldom fully funded, some employers, or employers in bar-
gaining with unions, decided to reward their long-term, retiring workers. 
They latched onto this DB design as a way to try to replace in retirement 
a signiﬁ  cant portion of those workers’ last years of salary. Gradually the 
design was extended to the next generations, and government started 
insisting that such plans be funded. 
This design took off and for a time dominated private pension policy. 
But certain aspects of it were and always have been crazy. Calculate, if 
you will, the value of the DB beneﬁ  t in deﬁ  ned contribution (DC) terms—
that is, what a person gets if he or she stays on the job for one more year. 
I initially did this type of calculation when I was ﬁ  rst at the Treasury 
Department in the 1970s, a period when rising inﬂ  ation kept lowering 
the economic value of the DB plan for almost all younger employees—
but especially those who left a ﬁ  rm before an age that beneﬁ  ts are paid 
out. (The measure of the last or highest years of salary is not adjusted for 
inﬂ  ation, so someone who leaves a ﬁ  rm when 50 years old will suffer a 
beneﬁ  t erosion due to 15 years of inﬂ  ation if the beneﬁ  t, based on ﬁ  nal 
salary, is provided at age 65.) 
This DB plan design creates other problems as well, encouraging some 
employers to get rid of older workers and encouraging some older work-
ers to quit. Because staying on the job for awhile compounds beneﬁ  ts in 
an exponential fashion (for reasons I will not explain here), employers 
offering DB plans have an extraordinary incentive to get rid of senior 
employees in the fast-accruing years immediately prior to retirement. 
After all, the $30,000-a-year 50-year-old worker might be accruing 
$9,000 in pension beneﬁ   ts, whereas the 25-year-old worker paid the 
same salary might be accruing next to nothing. It might make sense, for 
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instance, to move a plant from Michigan to Tennessee when this non-
cash pension compensation gets very high for an aging workforce that 
has been in place for years. 
After their plan reaches peak economic value, on the other hand, 
employees often move into a situation where they accrue negative eco-
nomic beneﬁ  ts in their pension plan, so they retire early. Think of school 
teachers working for state governments, who get a maximum pension 
beneﬁ  t of 50 percent of pay after a certain number of years on the job. 
In this case, if a fully vested teacher paid $50,000 in her ﬁ  nal years of 
employment retires, she gets $25,000 of pension beneﬁ  t annually. If she 
continues to teach another year, she gets $50,000 of pay (assuming this 
salary is capped) but totally loses the pension beneﬁ  t for that year. 
So what is the sin here? Some economists like to argue that DB plans 
were appropriate for an older economic era where people did not work 
beyond the age of 55 or 60, stayed with the same employer through most 
of their lives, and did not have such long life expectancies. Perhaps DB 
plans were more appropriate in the past than today, but were many of 
these features of DB plans, such as lack of inﬂ  ation adjustment, ever really 
appropriate? The historical data simply do not support the view that in 
some halcyon earlier period, most American workers were employed by 
the same ﬁ  rm for most of their lives, and by the time they were 60 years 
old retired after 35-40 years with a gold watch and a golden pension. 
Workers who ﬁ  t this description were the exception, not the rule. Many 
of the other workers suffered discrimination, albeit legal discrimination, 
in their compensation packages when they achieved much lower rates 
of accrual in their pension plans for doing the same job. We need to 
admit it when crazy sets of incentives like the ones that have evolved 
from DB plans have real world implications, and accordingly adjust our 
plan designs, policies, and laws deﬁ  ning what is truly discriminatory.
Deadly Sin #7: Hubris about Knowing the Future
Now let me turn to the most deadly sin of all. Dante believed that Pride 
was the root of all sins and in Purgatorio he suggested that all souls 
must be ﬁ  rst “purged” of that sin. The root of our sins in aging policy 
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about being able to predict the future accurately. We then overconﬁ  dently 
enact long-term entitlement policies that hamstring our children from 
following their own vision for how their society should evolve.  
Let me explain this hubris in the context of today’s federal budget. We 
have had budget problems before, but these were always easily contained 
in the following years simply by showing a little less exuberance in enact-
ing new legislation. Today, however, so many entitlement beneﬁ  ts have 
been promised for so far into the future that government has lost almost 
complete control over the future direction of policy. Decisions made in 
the past continually deter today’s policymakers from better allocating 
resources to meet the current needs of society and the new desires of vot-
ers in a democratic society.  Those policy decisions that attempt to pre-
ordain the future are mainly in the areas of retirement and healthcare, 
and in both cases the spending growth largely applies to the older adult 
population (children’s healthcare, for instance, is relatively inexpensive). 
Fundamentally, the federal government is oriented ever more each year 
to serving us when we are older. Middle-aged people, for instance, can 
expect to get larger and larger shares of government revenues for them-
selves, but smaller and smaller shares for their children or grandchildren. 
Among other considerations, this approach treats future generations of 
adults like permanent minors, whose future options must be controlled in 
advance. If they ever want to do something new with the taxes they will 
be paying, we budgetarily box them into ﬁ  rst having to retract on prom-
ises already made. We or our predecessors have essentially put into the 
law requirements for how all future revenues of the government should 
be spent for all eternity. 
Pride and Prejudice
In sum, aging policy and research needs to pay attention to its seven 
deadly sins if it is to advance policy in the interest of all U.S. citizens, 
young and old, living and still not born. 
Atoning for these sins of omission and commission will not be easy, but 
with the aging of the baby boom generation—the ﬁ  rst cohorts, born in 
1946, start collecting Social Security in 2008 and Medicare in 2011—we 
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will be increasingly hard-pressed every year we delay ﬁ  xing those pro-
grams. Reform is going to mean swallowing our pride, and giving up our 
natural prejudices toward old ways of doing things. These ingrained hab-
its are considerable, and include: 1) accounting for a labor market prob-
lem mainly in ﬁ  nancial terms; 2) ﬁ  ghting over retirement policy without 
setting targets based on ﬁ  rmly articulated principles; 3) excluding prin-
cipled reforms because these are not part of today’s politically correct 
debate; 4) poorly deﬁ  ning what it means to be aged; 5) ignoring both 
sides of the budgetary balance sheet; 6) defending parts of the status quo 
as natural when these policies derive from little more than past arbitrary 
decision-making, and 7) maintaining the hubris that we should restrict 
our children’s ability to determine how government should best meet the 
needs of their future society. 